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Abstract
We examine how medium-term movements in real exchange rates and GDP vary with
international financial conditions. For this purpose, we study the international transmission
of productivity shocks across a variety of IRBC models that incorporate different assumptions
about the persistence of productivity shocks, the degree of international risk sharing and access
to international asset markets. Using a new global solution method, we demonstrate that the
transmission of productivity shocks depends critically on the proximity of a national economy
to its international borrowing limit. We then show that this implication of the IRBC model
is consistent with the behavior of the US-UK real exchange rate and GDP over the past 200
years. The model also produces a negative correlation between relative consumption growth
and real depreciation rate consistent with more recent data, and hence offers a resolution of
the Backus-Smith puzzle.
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Introduction
Research on the behavior of real exchange rates spans a broad frequency spectrum. At one
end, macroeconomic models emphasize how changing interest rates (driven by monetary policy and
other variables) induce monthly and quarterly variations in real exchange-rates via their impact on
nominal exchange-rates in the presence of price-stickiness (see, e.g., Engel et al., 2008).1 At the
other end of the spectrum, following Harrod (1933), Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964), a large
empirical literature examines how very low frequency or secular movements in real exchange rates
are linked to sectoral shifts in productivity and other factors. This paper focuses on the behavior of
real exchange rates in the less studied center of the frequency spectrum; that is the middle ground
between business-cycles and the very long run. In particular, we examine how medium-term co-
movements in real exchange rates and GDP vary with international financial conditions.
We begin by documenting the empirical importance of medium-term co-movements in the real
exchange rate and GDP (per capita) using more than 200 years of US and UK data. We show that
shocks driving the cyclical components of GDP have persistent exchange-rate effects that last for
approximately ten years, and that these shocks account for a significant fraction of the real US-UK
depreciation rate over horizons ranging from five to fifteen years. Our empirical estimates also show
that shocks producing an increase in US (UK) GDP generally induce an initial real appreciation
(depreciation) of the US dollar which is amplified during the next few years.
Next, we compare these empirical findings with the theoretical predictions of International
Real Business Cycle (IRBC) models. In particular, we examine whether the medium-term co-
movements in GDP and the real exchange-rate are consistent with the international transmission
and propagation of productivity shocks.
Our theoretical analysis has two noteworthy features. First, we use a newly developed solution
method that accurately captures the nonlinear equilibrium dynamics of IRBC models globally;
that is to say, not just in the neighborhood of the steady state. Our analysis of these equilibrium
dynamics reveals that the co-movements in GDP and the real exchange rate induced by productivity
shocks vary according to prevailing financial conditions; specifically, the proximity of a national
economy to its international borrowing limit.
Second, we consider several different “varieties” of the IRBC model with a common core: There
are two countries, which we call the US and UK, each populated by a large number of households.
Each country hosts a representative firm that produces a tradable good using domestic labor and
1More recent work such as Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) and Itskhoki and Mukhin (2017) highlights the importance
of financial intermediaries and financial frictions in the short-run variations of nominal exchange rates.
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capital. The firm hires labor and undertakes investment to maximize its total value to its share-
holders. Households consume a basket of US and UK tradable goods, provide labor to domestic
firms, and hold a portfolio of financial assets. Beyond these core features, we examine models that
make different assumptions about the persistence of productivity shocks, the degree of international
risk sharing and access to international asset markets. This enables us to identify features of the
international transmission mechanism that apply across a range of models in the IRBC class.
Our analysis reveals the following characterization of the transmission mechanism. When inter-
national risk-sharing is incomplete, a positive productivity shock to US firms will generally raise
the wealth of US households (who hold the firms’ equity) more than UK households. This, in turn,
increases the demand for the baskets of US and UK traded goods by all households. On the pro-
duction side, the productivity shock raises the marginal product of US capital and thereby creates
an incentive for US firms to undertake more physical investment. So the transmission mechanism
must reconcile higher investment by US firms with greater consumption by US and UK households.
This reconciliation takes place via movements in the relative prices of US and UK goods faced by
US and UK households. In particular, the relative price of US goods rises for UK households so
that they substitute UK for US goods in their consumption baskets. This reduces world demand
for US goods, thereby facilitating US investment, and increases world demand for the UK good.
Consequently, US net exports fall. The change in relative prices also reduces the marginal revenue
product of UK capital, so the increase in demand for UK goods is accommodated at the exist-
ing level of production by a fall in UK investment. Thus, taken together, the productivity shock
produces an immediate change in relative prices, which is reflected in a real appreciation of the
US dollar, that facilitates a rise in US investment and a fall in UK investment accompanied by a
deterioration in the US net foreign asset position. Relative prices also adjust through time as the
effects of the productivity shock diminish. These adjustments facilitate the return of the US net
foreign asset position and the US and UK capital stocks to the levels consistent with the long-run
levels of productivity.
The operation of the transmission mechanism relies on several structural features: the persis-
tence of productivity shocks, the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods in
households’ consumption baskets, and the impediments to risk-sharing. It also only operates when
US households’ existing asset holdings enable them to freely borrow internationally. When house-
holds are close to or at their international borrowing limit, US positive productivity shocks induce
a real depreciation of the US dollar rather than an appreciation. As US households cannot borrow
to finance more investment and consumption, the increase in demand for US goods is outweighed
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by the rise in the supply of US goods, which depresses the relative price of US goods inducing the
real depreciation.
To check whether there is any empirical support for this transmission mechanism, we return
to the US-UK data. Using a chronology from Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), we show that annual
co-movements in GDP and the real exchange rate depend on whether either the US or UK was in a
banking crisis. In the years without crises, the co-movements in GDP and real exchange rates are
consistent with the IRBC transmission of productivity shocks away from the international borrowing
limit. In years with either a US or UK banking crisis, which hinders international borrowing and
lending, the co-movements in GDP and the real exchange rate are consistent with the operation of
the IRBC transmission mechanism near the borrowing constraint.
This paper contributes to very large literatures that study the behavior of real exchange rates
and international macroeconomics using IRBC models.2 We therefore focus on papers from these
literatures that are most directly relate to our study. Our empirical analysis of the US-UK real
exchange rate builds on Lothian and Taylor (2008) insofar as we use US and UK per capita GDP to
identify the long-run real exchange rate.3 Consistent with Ricci et al. (2013), our empirical model
takes the form of an error-correction model, but we also allow for state-dependency to capture the
effects of banking crises. Our theoretical analysis is most closely related to work on the exchange-
rate implications of IRBC models. Backus and Smith (1993) and Kollmann (1995) pointed out that
real exchange rates should be perfectly correlated with relative cross-country consumption under
complete risk-sharing, but the empirical correlation is negative or close to zero for many country
pairs. This finding is commonly referred to as the Backus-Smith puzzle. Subsequent research
has explored how incomplete risk-sharing affects the correlation (see, e.g., Corsetti et al., 2008,
Kollmann, 2012, Benigno and Thoenissen, 2008 and Benigno and Kucuk, 2012).4 We also analyze
the implications of the IRBC model with incomplete risk-sharing, but our attention is mainly on
the joint behavior of the real exchange rate and GDP. Our focus on the medium-run is also shared
by Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez (2015), who note that most of the variation in real exchange rates
occurs at lower than business-cycle frequencies. Finally, our analysis extends existing research on
solving international macro models with incomplete risk-sharing and portfolio choice. Existing
2For surveys of the real exchange-rate literature; see, e.g., Froot and Rogoff (1995) and Edwards and Savastano
(2000). Important early contributions in international macroeconomics using IRBC models include; Backus et al.
(1992), Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Kehoe and Perri (2002).
3Other contributions to the literature on the long-term determinants of real exchange rates include Edwards and
Ostry (1990), De Gregorio et al. (1994), Ostry (1994), De Gregorio et al. (1994), Froot and Rogoff (1995), Goldfajn
and Valdes (1999), Chen and Rogoff (2003), Cashin et al. (2004), and Galstyan and Lane (2009), among others.
4Recent research on the Backus-Smith puzzle that departs from the canonical IRBC setup includes: Colacito and
Croce (2013), Kollmann (2016) and Tretvoll (2018) who change preferences; Bodenstein (2008) who includes limited
enforcement of financial contracts, and Rouillard (2018) who adds financial frictions on firms.
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methods developed by Devereux and Sutherland (2010), Tille and van Wincoop (2010) and Evans
and Hnatkovska (2012) approximate the equilibrium around the steady state, whereas we adapt the
global solution method in Cao (2010, 2018) to accommodate portfolio choice.5,6 The use of a global
solution method allows us to examine how the exchange-rate implications of productivity shocks
critically depend on the economy’s proximity to the borrowing constraint.
The paper is structured as follows. We begin, in Section 1, with our preliminary analysis of the
US-UK data. Section 2 presents our benchmark version of the IRBC model, that includes the core
features of all model variants we study. We then provide a description of the models’ equilibrium
and our solution method in Section 3. In Section 4 we examine the transmission mechanism in
the benchmark version of the IRBC model and compare the implications for the behavior of real
exchange rates and GDP with the US-UK data. Section 5 examines the transmission mechanism
across different variants of the IRBC model and investigates the models’ implications for resolving
the Backus-Smith puzzle. Section 6 concludes.
1 Empirical Analysis
We focus on the medium-term behavior of real exchange rates; that is in the middle ground
between business-cycles and the very long run. For this purpose, our analysis uses more than 200
years of annual data (1880 - 2016) on exchange rates, prices and GDP from the US and UK. These
data extend the time series of exchange rates and prices constructed by Lothian and Taylor (1996).
The data for per capita GDP is obtained from The Maddison Project (2018). In this section, we
present a time-series model that characterizes the medium-term co-movements in the data. We will
examine how these co-movements depend on financial conditions in Subsection 4.3 below.
For the purpose of this study, we define the real exchange rate as the relative price of the basket
of goods consumed in the UK in terms of the price of a basket of goods consumed in the US.
Mathematically, the real exchange rate in period t is calculated as
Et =
StPˆt
Pt
, (1)
5These solution methods have been used to study external adjustment (see, e.g., Tille and van Wincoop, 2010
and Evans, 2014) and origins of home bias in international portfolio holdings (see, e.g., Coeurdacier and Gourinchas,
2008, Hnatkovska, 2009, Engel and Matsumoto, 2009, Coeurdacier et al., 2010, Devereux and Sutherland, 2010, and
Coeurdacier and Rey, 2012).
6We extend the solution method in Cao (2010, 2018) to allow for endogenous capital accumulation, imperfect
substitution between traded goods, and up to five continuous state variables.
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where Pt and Pˆt are US and UK period-t price indices and St denotes the period-t nominal exchange
rate measured as the price of a UK pound in US dollars. (Hereafter we use hats to denote UK
variables.) According to this definition, a depreciation (appreciation) in the real value of the US
dollar corresponds to a rise (fall) in Et.
The first step in constructing our empirical model accounts for the fact that both the US and
UK economies have undergone secular changes during the past 200 years which have produced long-
run exchange-rate effects. Consistent with the empirical literature, these long-run effects appear
to be well-represented by cointegration between the log real exchange rate "t = log Et and log per
capita real GDP in the US and UK, yt = log Yt and yˆt = log Yˆt . In particular, we estimate the
cointegrating relation to be
"t = 0.624
(0.367)
+ 0.558
(0.118)
yˆTrendt − 0.439
(0.079)
yTrendt , (2)
where yTrendt and yˆ
Trend
t are the trends in yt and yˆt computed from the HP filter. Equation (2)
shows the cointegrating coefficient estimates and their standard errors computed by DOLS following
Stock and Watson (1993).7 Estimating the cointegration regression between the log real exchange
rate and the logs of per capital GDP rather than the HP trends produces very similar results. We
prefer to use the HP trends because the long-run level for "t implied by the cointegration estimates
has less year-by-year variation, which seems more economically plausible. Figure 1 plots the log real
exchange rate "t and these long-run estimates "
LR
t over our sample period. We are agnostic about
the underlying economic reason for cointegration in the data. It could represent the long-term
effects of sectoral shifts in productivity, changes in the terms of trade, government consumption,
trade policy or a structural shift. Our focus is instead on the medium-term variations in "t that
are not included in "LRt .
8
7Statistical tests reveal that we cannot reject null of a unit root in εt , yTrendt and yˆ
Trend
t individually, and we can
reject the null of no cointegration between the three variables. In particular, the ADF tests for the null hypothesis
that εt contains a unit root produce p-values of 0.167 and 0.4512, with and without a constant, respectively, while
the KPSS test for the null hypothesis that εt is stationary produces a p-value of less than 0.01. In the case of yTrendt
and yˆTrendt , the ADT tests produce p-values of over 0.99, and the KPSS tests produce p-values of less than 0.01.
The ADF test for the null hypothesis of no cointegration produces a p-value of less than 0.01. We obtain very similar
results using per capita GDP, yt and yˆt, rather than the HP trends.
8Much of the research on the long-term determinants of real exchange rates originates with the Harrod-Balassa-
Samuelson (HBS) model (Harrod, 1933 Balassa, 1964 and Samuelson, 1964). For example, Lothian and Taylor (2008)
use the HBS model as the rationale for defining the long-run US-UK rate in terms of the difference between US and
UK log per capita GDP. Other contributions by De Gregorio et al. (1994), Chen and Rogoff (2003), Cashin et al.
(2004), and Ricci et al. (2013), among others, focus on the terms of trade. The role of government consumption
is considered in Froot and Rogoff (1995), Ostry (1994), De Gregorio et al. (1994), and Galstyan and Lane (2009);
while Edwards and Ostry (1990) and Goldfajn and Valdes (1999) study the effects of trade policy. Ricci et al. (2013)
examine all these factors in a panel cointegration model covering 24 years and 48 countries.
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Figure 1: US/UK Real Exchange Rate
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Notes: Log Real Exchange Rate εt (solid) and log long-run level ε
LR
t implied by cointegration (dashed):
annual data 1880-2016.
Our empirical model comprises three equations: one for the annual real depreciation rate ∆"t =
"t − "t 1, and one each for the cyclical component of US and UK per capita GDP computed from
the HP filter; denoted by yCyclet and yˆ
Cycle
t , respectively
∆"t =
h
 1  2
i24 yCyclet
yˆCyclet
3
5+  gapt 1 + et, (3)
2
4 yCyclet
yˆCyclet
3
5 =
2
4 ↵11 ↵12
↵21 ↵22
3
5
2
4 yCyclet 1
yˆCyclet 1
3
5+
2
4  1
 2
3
5∆"t 1 +
2
4 vt
vˆt
3
5 , (4)
where gapt = "t−0.624−0.558yˆ
Trend
t +0.439y
Trend
t is the error-correction term from the cointegrat-
ing regression. Equation (3) relates the current real depreciation rate to the cyclical components of
GDP in the US and UK and the lagged error-correction term. Equation (4) characterizes the joint
dynamics of the cyclical components of GDP in terms of past cyclical GDP and the real depreciation
rate. These equations allow us to empirically characterize the joint dynamics of the real exchange
rate and GDP in a parsimonious manner. Estimating alternative specifications that include, for
example, lagged depreciation rates in (3) and error-correction terms in (4), produce statistically
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insignificant coefficients on the additional variables.
Panel I of Table 1 reports the OLS estimates of (3) and (4). Both regression equations appear
well-specified; the majority of the coefficient estimates are highly statistically significant and the
is no evidence of residual correlation. Column (i) reports the estimates of the depreciation rate
equation in (3). The estimates imply that shocks that raise cyclical GDP in the US tend to also
produce a real appreciation of the US dollar, whereas shocks that increase cyclical GDP in the UK
produce a real depreciation. Columns (ii) and (iii) report the estimates of the GDP equations (4).
Here we see that there is significant cross-country dependency via lagged GDP in the case of the
US equation and via the lagged real depreciation rate in the UK equation.
To provide more perspective on the implications of the model estimates, Figure 2 plots the
dynamic response of the log real exchange rate to a shock that induces a one percent increase in
either yCyclet or yˆ
Cycle
t .
9 The plots show that positive shocks to the cyclical components of US
and UK GDP have opposite initial effects on the real exchange rate; producing a real appreciation
(depreciation) when the shock affects US (UK) GDP. These effects are amplified in the next one
to two years as they produce feedback effects on cyclical GDP in both countries, before slowly
disappearing over the next decade.
The persistence of the dynamic responses in Figure 2 is also reflected in the variance decompo-
sitions for the real depreciation rate reported in Panel II of Table 1. The upper row of statistics
shows the contribution of cyclical and trend GDP to the variance of the real depreciation rate over
horizons ranging from one to twenty years.10 These statistics show that GDP contributes most to
the variations in the real exchange rate at around the ten-year horizon (the exact maximum con-
tribution is estimated to be 22 percent at 11 years). The cyclical components of GDP account for
9The goal here is simply to characterize the joint dynamics of the ∆εt, y
Cycle
t and yˆ
Cycle
t rather than to identify
the effects of particular economic shocks. Mathematically, (3) and (4) can be rewritten as a Vector Error Correction
Model (VECM) for ∆εt, y
Cycle
t and yˆ
Cycle
t with zero restrictions on several of the coefficients. The plots in Figure 2
correspond to the impulse responses functions (IRFs) from the constrained VECM to positive vt and vˆt shocks. We
have also computed (IRFs) that account for the estimated correlation between vt and vˆt shocks, using a standard
Cholesky identification scheme with different orderings. The IRFs from these identification schemes are very similar
to those plotted in Figure 2.
10To compute these variance contributions, we use the estimates of (3) and (4) to decompose the time se-
ries for εt into three components: one driven by the vt and vˆt shocks to y
Cycle
t and yˆ
Cycle
t , denoted by
ε
Cycle
t ; one driven by the changes in y
Trend
t and yˆ
Trend
t , denoted by ε
Trend
t ; and one driven by the et shocks,
denoted by εet . By construction, εt = ε
Cycle
t + ε
Trend
t + ε
e
t , so the variance of the k-year depreciation
rate can be written as V ar(∆kεt) = Cov(∆kεt,∆kε
Cycle
t ) + Cov(∆
kεt,∆kεTrendt ) + Cov(∆
kεt,∆kεet ), where
∆kdenotes the k’th difference operator. The variance contribution of the cyclical and trend GDP components is⇣
Cov(∆kεt,∆kε
Cycle
t ) + Cov(∆
kεt,∆kεTrendt )
⌘
/V ar(∆kεt), which we compute as the slope coefficient from a re-
gression of ∆kεCyclet + ∆
kεTrendt on ∆
kεt. The variance contribution of the trend GDP components is computed
analogously from the regression of ∆kεTrendt on ∆
kεt. Standard errors for the variance contributions are computed
from the regressions with the Newey-West estimator which allows for heteroskedasticity and overlapping data.
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Table 1: Model Estimates
I: Estimates ∆"t y
Cycle
t (US) yˆ
Cycle
t (UK)
Equation
(i) (ii) (iii)
Regressors
yCycle (US) -0.262⇤ 0.496⇤⇤⇤ -0.003
(0.147) (0.082) (0.052)
yˆCycle (UK) 0.526⇤⇤⇤ 0.278⇤⇤⇤ 0.536⇤⇤⇤
(0.159) (0.099) (0.095)
gap -0.175⇤⇤⇤
(0.034)
∆" 0.043 0.063⇤⇤⇤
(0.033) (0.024)
SEE 0.064 0.033 0.025
R2 0.137 0.388 0.324
II: Variance Contribution Horizon (years)
1. 5. 10. 15. 20.
GDP Contribution 0.062 0.167 0.217 0.192 0.144
(standard error) (0.019) (0.024) (0.030) (0.036) (0.025)
Trend GDP Contribution 0.011 0.036 0.082 0.099 0.077
(standard error) (0.007) (0.012) (0.019) (0.027) (0.023)
Notes: Panel I reports estimates of (3) and (4). Estimates are computed by OLS from annual data 1802-
2016 (215 observations), and robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates.
Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively. Panel II reports
the estimated contribution of US and UK GDP (trend and cyclical components) to the variance of the real
depreciation rate over horizons from one to 20 years, and the variance contributions of the trend components
in US and UK GDP alone. See footnote 10 for details.
most of these contributions. When we recalculate the variance contributions without the cyclical
components (i.e., imposing the restriction that  1 =  2 = 0), the variance contributions of GDP
fall by at least 50 percent, as is shown by the lower row of statistics.11
To summarize, our empirical analysis reveals that variations in cyclical GDP become more
economically important as proximate drivers of the real depreciation rate beyond business-cycle
11Our results are consistent with the finding in Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez (2015) that most of the variation in
real exchange rates occurs at lower than business-cycle frequencies. While they used spectral methods to decomposed
the variance of the real exchange rates by frequency, we focus on the contribution of shocks that also drive cyclical
GDP.
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Figure 2: Real Exchange Rate Response
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Notes: The figure plots the dynamic response of the log real exchange
rate to a shock that induces a one percent increase in either yCyclet (US)
or yˆCyclet (UK).
frequencies. Shocks driving the cyclical components of the GDP appear to have a sizable and
persistent impact on the real US-UK exchange rate, and account for more than ten percent of the
variations in the real depreciation rate over horizons ranging from five to fifteen years.
2 The Model
We now examine whether the transmission and propagation of productivity shocks in a variety
of IRBC models would produce co-movements in real exchange rates and GDP consistent with the
US-UK data. Our analysis is centered on a benchmark model with two symmetric countries and
stationary productivity shocks. Each country is populated by a large number of identical utility-
maximizing households who have access to financial markets for equities and bonds. We depart from
the complete markets/complete risk-sharing assumption made in Backus et al. (1992) by limiting
international financial asset trades. Households can trade equity issued by domestic firms and
internationally-traded bonds, but they cannot trade equity issued by foreign firms. We deliberately
omit features found in other open economy models, such as non-traded goods, distribution sectors,
and sticky prices, in order to focus on the key IRBC transmission mechanisms. Nevertheless, the
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benchmark model allows for a variety of complex interactions between the consumption, savings
and portfolio decisions of households, and the production decisions of firms. Our solution method
allows us to investigate how these interactions contribute to the transmission of productivity shocks
across the entire state-space (i.e., globally), which in turn enables us to identify the origins of state-
dependence in the dynamics of the real exchange rate.
This section describes the structure of the benchmark model, defines the equilibrium, and
presents the calibration we use in our solution method. In subsequent sections, we show that
the key economic elements of the transmission mechanism in our benchmark model apply across
other IRBC variants. These variants include models with financial autarky, models which allow
households greater access to international financial markets, and models with co-integrated non-
stationary productivity shocks.
2.1 Households
We refer to the two countries in our models as the US and UK. The US is populated by a
continuum of identical households distributed on the interval [0,1/2) with preferences defined over
a consumption basket of traded goods. In particular, the expected utility of a representative US
household in period t is given by
Ut = Et
1X
i=0
 i
n
1
1  C
1  
t+i
o
,
where   > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk-aversion and 1 >   > 0 is the subjective discount
factor. Et denotes expectations conditioned on period t information. Ct is the consumption index
defined over two consumption goods; a US-produced good, CUSt , and a UK-produced good, C
UK
t .
We assume that the index takes the CES form so Ct = C(C
US
t , C
UK
t ) where C is defined as
C(a, b) =
⇣
↵
1
θ a
θ−1
θ + (1− ↵)
1
θ b
θ−1
θ
⌘ θ
θ−1
, (5)
with elasticity parameter ✓, and share parameter ↵ for the US good. We also assume consumption
home-bias: ↵ > 1/2.
Pt is the associated consumption price index for US households in US dollars
Pt =
 
↵(PUSt )
1 ✓ + (1− ↵) (PUKt )
1 ✓
  1
1−θ , (6)
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where PUSt and P
UK
t are the dollar prices at which the US households purchase US and UK goods
respectively. US households are also endowed with one unit of labor and derive nominal wage
income of Wt from working for US firms.
In our benchmark model, US households can trade equity shares of the representative US firm
and a bond. The bond payoff is denominated in the US price index so it is risk-free from the
perspective of US households. The budget constraint of US households is therefore given by
PtCt +Qt t +Q
b
tbt ≤ (Dt +Qt) t 1 + Ptbt 1 +Wt, (7a)
where:  t is the number of shares of equity issued by US firms held by the US household; Qt is
the nominal price of equity issued by US firms; Dt is the nominal dividend paid by US firms; bt
is the number of bonds held by the US household; Qbt is nominal price of a bond (in US dollars).
Dividing both sides of the budget constraint (7a) by Pt, we obtain the constraint in real terms
Ct + qt t + q
b
t bt ≤ (dt + qt) t 1 + bt 1 + wt, (7b)
where qt, q
b
t , and wt are the corresponding real values of Qt, Q
b
t , and Wt. We also impose exogenous
constraints on real bond holdings
bt ≥ b. (8)
These borrowing limits will be adjusted by the current level of productivity when productivity
shocks are not stationary.
Similarly, the UK is populated by a continuum of households distributed on the interval [1/2,1].
Here the preferences of the representative UK household have an analogous form to the one for the
representative US household except that the consumption index, Cˆt, replaces Ct:
Uˆt = Et
1X
i=0
 i 11   Cˆ
1  
t+i .
UK and US households have symmetric preferences with respect to individual traded goods, so
Cˆt = C(Cˆ
UK
t , Cˆ
US
t ) where C is given in (5) and Cˆ
UK
t and Cˆ
US
t denote the consumption of UK and
US-produced goods by UK households. The price index for UK households in pounds is given by
Pˆt =
⇣
↵ˆ(PˆUSt )
1 ✓ + (1− ↵ˆ) (PˆUKt )
1 ✓
⌘ 1
1−θ
. (9)
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where ↵ˆ = 1−↵. UK households can trade equity shares of the representative UK firm and the US
bond. Their budget constraints in nominal and real terms are given by
PˆtCˆt + Qˆt ˆt +
Qbt
St
bˆt ≤ (Dˆt + Qˆt) ˆt 1 +
Pt
St
bˆt 1 + Wˆt, (10a)
and
Cˆt + qˆt t + (q
b
,t/Et)bt ≤ (dˆt + qˆt) ˆt 1 + (1/Et)bˆt 1 + wˆt, (10b)
where  ˆt and bˆt are the number of UK equity shares and US bonds held by UK households, and
recall that St and Et are the nominal and real US-UK exchange rates. We also impose exogenous
constraints on real bond holdings of UK households
bˆt ≥ b. (11)
We assume that the law of one price holds for both traded goods, so PUKt = StPˆ
UK
t and P
US
t =
StPˆ
US
t . Let p
US
t = P
US
t /Pt and p
UK
t = P
UK
t /Pt denote the relative prices of US and UK goods faced
by US households, and pˆUSt = Pˆ
US
t /Pˆt and pˆ
UK
t = Pˆ
UK
t /Pˆt denote the relative prices faced by UK
households. Then, by the definition of real exchange rate in (1), pUSt = Etpˆ
US
t and p
UK
t = Etpˆ
UK
t .
From the definitions of Pt and Pˆt in (6) and (9), we obtain 1 = ↵(p
US
t )
1 ✓ + (1 − ↵)(pUKt )
1 ✓
and 1 = ↵ˆ(pˆUSt )
1 ✓ +(1− ↵ˆ) (pˆUKt )
1 ✓. Combining these equations with (1) produces the following
expression for the real exchange rate
Et =
✓
1− ↵
1− ↵ˆ
+
(↵− ↵ˆ) (pˆUSt )
1 ✓
1− ↵ˆ
◆ 1
θ−1
. (12)
Notice that this expression for Et is decreasing in pˆ
US
t when there is consumption home bias (↵ > ↵ˆ).
In other words, a depreciation of the real exchange rate lowers the relative price of US goods facing
UK households when there is consumption home bias. We will make use of this link between the
real exchange rate and relative prices below.
2.2 Firms
There is a single industry in each country, and each industry is populated by a continuum of
identical firms distributed on the interval [0,1]. A representative US firm owns all of its capital stock,
Kt, and hires labor Lt to produce output of US goods, Yt, according to Yt = F (At,Kt, Lt) where
F is a constant-returns-to-scale production function, and At denotes the state of productivity. The
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output of UK goods by a representative UK firm, Yˆt, is given by an identical production function
using its own capital, Kˆt, and hiring labor Lˆt, with productivity Aˆt.
Firms in each country choose production and investment plans to maximize their total value to
shareholders. In particular, a representative US firm solves
max
{Dt+i,It+i,Kt+i+1}
Et
1X
i=0
 i
 t+i
 t
Dt+i
Pt+i
s.t.
Dt = P
US
t F (At,Kt, Lt)−WtLt − P
US
t It and Kt+1 = (1−  )Kt + It,
where: It is investment, 1 >   > 0 is the depreciation rate, and  t is the stochastic discount factor
of the firm’s shareholders. Since equity can only be traded in domestic asset markets, the firm’s
shareholders are US households, so  t = C
  
t .
After substituting out investment, the problem of a representative US firm can be rewritten in
real terms as
max
{Kt+i+1,Lt+i}
Et
1X
i=0
 i
 t+i
 t
n
ptF (At+i,Kt+i, Lt+i)− wt+iLt+i − pt[Kt+i+1 − (1−  )Kt+i]
⌘o
.
Similarly, a representative UK firm solves
max
{Kˆt+i+1,Lˆt+i}
Et
1X
i=0
 i
 ˆt+i
 ˆt
n
pˆt+iF (Aˆt+i, Kˆt+i, Lˆt+i)− wˆt+iLˆt+i − pˆt+i[Kˆt+i+1 − (1−  )Kˆt+i]
⌘o
,
where the stochastic discount factor is given by the marginal utility of UK households,  ˆt = Cˆ
  
t .
Production Functions and Productivity Processes We assume that production functions
are Cobb-Douglas: F (A,K,L) ≡ AK⌘L1 ⌘, with 1 > ⌘ ≥ 0. We also assume, following Backus
et al. (1992), that log productivity in each country follows stationary AR(1) processes:
logAt = ⇢ logAt 1 + ✏t (13a)
and
log Aˆt = ⇢ log Aˆt 1 + ✏ˆt, (13b)
with 1 > ⇢ > 0, where ✏t and ✏ˆt are I.I.D productivity shocks. In subsequent sections, we examine
the implications of alternative productivity processes; including specifications that allow for cor-
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relations between the shocks as in Heathcote and Perri (2002), and unit-root specifications as in
Rabanal et al. (2011).
2.3 Equilibrium
We study a standard sequential competitive equilibrium: in equilibrium, prices and allocations
are such that allocations solve the households’ and firms’ optimization problems and all markets
clear in each history of shocks. Numerically, we solve for sequential competitive equilibrium with
a particular recursive structure: a recursive equilibrium is a sequential competitive equilibrium in
which prices and allocations are (single-valued) functions of two exogenous state variables; the levels
of US and UK productivity (At, Aˆt), and three endogenous state variables; the US and UK capital
stocks, and US bond holdings (Kt, Kˆt, bt 1). In our benchmark model, the only internationally
traded asset is the US bond. This bond is in zero net supply, so 0 = bt + bˆt by market clearing.
Thus bt 1 identifies the US net foreign asset position at the start of period t. In the other IRBC
models we study, the recursive equilibrium requires a larger number of endogenous state variables,
which we describe below.
To calculate the moments from the solution of the model, we use the concept of a stationary
recursive equilibrium in Duffie et al. (1994) and Cao (2020). A stationary recursive equilibrium is
a recursive equilibrium with a stationary ergodic distribution resulting from the transition func-
tions for the state variables (i.e., (At, Aˆt,Kt, Kˆt, bt 1) in our benchmark model). We study the
equilibrium dynamics of variables with impulse response functions (IRFs) that are calculated by
simulating draws from the ergodic distribution. Precise definitions for these equilibrium concepts
and a description of the global solution method are given in Section 3.
2.4 Calibration
Since we focus on the equilibrium dynamics beyond the business cycles, we use annual frequencies
for our model (instead of the quarterly frequencies used in the IRBC literature starting with Backus
et al., 1992).12 We use the preference and technology parameters from Corsetti et al. (2008) who
provide annual estimates of these parameters. The parameters are given in Table 2. We use the
elasticity of substitution ✓ = 10 in the benchmark calibration. This elasticity is in the mid-range of
the estimates found in the trade literature as reported in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000, Section 2.3).
12In Appendix D, we use the quarterly productivity processes estimated in Heathcote and Perri (2002) and Rabanal
et al. (2011).
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For the borrowing limit, we use b = −1. The calibration of this lower bound implies that households
can borrow up to approximately 60% of their income (including capital and labor income).
Table 2: Benchmark Calibration
Parameters Descriptions Values
  discount factor 0.96
  risk aversion 2
↵ = 1− ↵ˆ home consumption share 0.72
✓ consumption elasticity 10
  depreciation rate 0.1
⌘ capital share 0.36
b borrowing limit −1
corr(lnAt, ln Aˆt) productivity correlation 0
⇢ productivity persistence 0.82
  productivity shock std. 0.022
2.5 Moments and Distributions
It is useful to briefly describe some of the characteristics of the equilibrium in our benchmark
model. To this end, Table 3 compares the variability of consumption, investment and productivity
in post-war US data (available from the St Louis Fed’s database, FRED), and the equilibrium of
the benchmark model. We follow the standard practice (Backus et al., 1992) of comparing the
standard deviation of each variable relative to the standard deviation of output. The benchmark
model’s statistics are calculated using long time series (40,000 years) simulated from the ergodic
distribution of the recursive equilibrium. For comparison purposes, we also report statistics from
the equilibrium of an IRBC model with complete risk-sharing that has all the core features of our
benchmark except the restrictions on asset trade.
As the table shows, the benchmark model comes close to replicating the relative variability of
consumption in the data, but somewhat understates (overstates) the relative variability of invest-
ment (productivity). These discrepancies between the data and model are most likely due to the
simplicity of our specification with respect to consumption and production.13 They do not appear
13Recall that, to highlight the transmission mechanism in our model, we choose to omit many ingredients that
would bring the business cycles moments closer to those in the data, such as non-traded goods or distribution services.
Corsetti et al. (2008) show that these ingredients are important quantitatively. For example, we use the standard
deviation for productivity shocks from the traded good sectors in Corsetti et al. (2008), which implies larger output
volatility than in the data. In the data, output includes both traded and non-traded goods.
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to be primarily attributable to the restrictions on asset trade because the relative variability of
investment and productivity under complete risk-sharing are almost identical.14 However, as we
would expect, the variability of consumption under complete risk-sharing is considerably lower than
in our benchmark model.
Table 3: Business Cycle Moments
Relative Variability: Std(X)/Sdt(Y )
X = Consumption Investment Productivity
Data 0.87 3.86 0.46
Benchmark 0.82 2.12 0.73
Complete Markets 0.54 2.14 0.74
We identify the recursive equilibrium in the benchmark model with three endogenous state
variables: the US and UK capital stocks, and US bond holdings; Kt, Kˆt and bt 1. Figure 3 shows
the marginal distributions of these endogenous state variables computed by simulation from the
stationary recursive equilibrium. The distributions for capital are unimodal and symmetric. In
contrast, the distribution for bt 1, which identifies the US net foreign asset (NFA) position, is
bimodal with peaks at the US and UK borrowing limits. This feature of the equilibrium reflects the
fact that shocks have persistent effects on the international distribution of bond holding away from
the borrowing limits: it appears in all the IRBC models we study with incomplete risk-sharing.15
As we shall see, the proximity of an economy to its international borrowing limit has important
implications for the transmission and propagation of productivity shocks.
14The relative volatility of productivity is really measuring the volatility of equilibrium output because productivity
is exogenous.
15The existing literature removes the feature by altering the model with stationary cardinal utility (Corsetti et al.,
2008) or with quadratic bond-holding cost (Heathcote and Perri, 2002). These modifications make it possible to
solve the model using local, linearization methods. But they also remove the state-dependent equilibrium properties,
which we focus on in the present paper.
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Figure 3: Histograms of State Variables
Note: This figure is generated by the solution of the baseline model with parameters given in Table 2.
3 Equilibrium Definitions and Solution Method
In this section, we provide a more detailed description of the equilibrium and the global solution
method. Readers wishing to skip these technical aspects of our work may proceed to Section 4
without loss of continuity.
3.1 Equilibrium
We use a standard definition of sequential competitive equilibrium: Given initial state variables
K0, b 1, Kˆ0, bˆ 1 = −bˆ1, a sequential competitive equilibrium (SCE) consists of stochastic sequences
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of allocations n
CUSt , C
UK
t , t, bt,Kt+1, Lt, Cˆ
US
t , Cˆ
UK
t ,  ˆt, bˆt, Kˆt+1, Lˆt
o
,
and prices  
pUSt , p
UK
t , qt, q
b
t , pˆ
US
t , pˆ
UK
t , qˆt, Et
 
,
such that the allocations solve households’ and firms’ optimization problems and markets clear.
Market clearing in the two goods markets requires that
Yt = AtK
⌘
t L
1 ⌘
t = C
US
t + Cˆ
US
t +Kt+1 − (1−  )Kt, and
Yˆt = AˆtKˆ
⌘
t Lˆ
1 ⌘
t = C
UK
t + Cˆ
UK
t + Kˆt+1 − (1−  )Kˆt.
Labor is supplied inelastically by domestic households. We normalize the labor supply to unity in
both counties so labor market clearing requires,
1 = Lt and 1 = Lˆt.
Finally, the total equity issued by US and UK firms is normalized to unity, and bonds are in zero
net supply, so the market clearing conditions in the four financial markets are
1 =  t, 1 =  ˆt, and 0 = bt + bˆt.
In order to solve for SCEs numerically, we look for recursive equilibria with a natural state space
that includes the following variables:
xt =
⇣
At, Aˆt,Kt, Kˆt, bt 1
⌘
,
when productivity processes are stationary. Notice that from the financial market clearing condi-
tions, equity holdings are always equal to 1 and the bond holdings of UK households are implied
by the bond holdings of US households. In a recursive equilibrium, the allocations and prices are
functions of the state variables.
Definition 1. A recursive equilibrium (RE) is a SCE in which the allocations and prices are
functions of the state variable xt:
zt = Z(xt)
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for each equilibrium variable z
z =
⇣
CUS, CUK, b0,K 0, CˆUS, CˆUK, bˆ0, Kˆ 0, pUS, pUK, q, qb, pˆUS, pˆUK, qˆ, E
⌘
, (14)
where b0,K 0 and bˆ0, Kˆ 0 stand for next period bond holdings and capital stocks.
For later reference, we use the notation K(x), Kˆ(x),B(x) for the K 0, Kˆ 0, b0 components of Z(x).
In Subsection 3.2, we present the solution method used to compute these REs. A related equilibrium
concept is the stationary recursive equilibrium which corresponds to a recursive equilibrium with a
stationary distribution over the state variables (see Duffie et al., 1994 and Cao, 2020).
Definition 2. An stationary recursive equilibrium is a RE with a stationary distribution ∆ over
the state variable x ∈ R5 such that ∆ is a fixed point of the transition function F implied by the
RE policy functions: ⇣
K(x), Kˆ(x),B(x)
⌘
,
and exogenous stochastic law of motion for A and Aˆ.
In an stationary recursive equilibrium, by the Ergodic Theorem, the long-run moments implied
by the model can be computed as deterministic functionals of the policy functions Z’s, transition
function, F , and stationary distribution ∆.
3.2 Global Solution Method
We solve for REs using policy-function iteration, a global method developed in Cao (2010,
2018) and Cao and Nie (2017). The method is well-suited for dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium (DSGE) models with portfolio choices.16 We extend the method to allow for endogenous
capital accumulation, imperfect substitutions between traded goods, and up to five continuous state
variables.17 In the recent international finance literature, Rabitsch et al. (2015) and Stepanchuk
and Tsyrennikov (2015) also solve a two-country model with portfolio choice using policy-function
iteration, but they only consider endowment economies, which allow them to describe the solution
with a single continuous state variable (the wealth share). Coeurdacier et al. (2019) allow for up to
16Earlier work using policy-function iterations for DSGE economies includes Coleman (1990) and Judd et al.
(2000).
17The incomplete markets two-bond model with co-integrated random walk productivity processes in Appendix D.2
features five continuous state variables: relative productivity, two capital stocks, and two bond positions. Because of
the presence of the two bonds, US and UK households need to solve portfolio choice problems. The bonds’ returns are
also close to being collinear because the variation of the real exchange rate is small when the elasticity of substitution,
θ, is high.
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three continuous state variables (two capital stocks and a bond position) but their model does not
feature portfolio choice or imperfect substitution between traded goods. We describe in detail our
global solution method below.
The optimization problems facing households and firms are concave maximization problems
(concave objectives and convex constraints). Therefore, to guarantee that the allocations solve the
agents’ optimization problems, it is necessary and sufficient that the allocations satisfy the first-
order conditions (F.O.C.s) at equilibrium prices. The Lagrange multiplier  t on the US households’
budget constraint, (7b), is shown below to be equal to their marginal utility, and let µt denote the
multiplier on the US households’ borrowing constraint, (8). For US households, the F.O.C.s are:
{Ct} :C
  
t =  t,
{bt} :−  tq
b
t +  Et[ t+1] + µt = 0,
{bt, µt} :µt(bt − b) = 0, µt ≥ 0 and
{ t} :− qt t +  Et[ t+1(qt+1 + dt+1)] = 0.
Similarly, we obtain the F.O.C.s for the UK households using the hat variables.
For US firms, the F.O.C in Kt+1 (It+1) is:
Et

 
 t+1
 t
pUSt+1
pUSt
⇣
⌘At+1K
⌘ 1
t+1 + 1−  
⌘
− 1
 
= 0,
and for UK firms, the F.O.C. in Kˆt+1 (Iˆt+1) is:
Et
"
 
 ˆt+1
 ˆt
pˆUKt+1
pˆUKt
⇣
⌘Aˆt+1Kˆ
⌘ 1
t+1 + 1−  
⌘
− 1
#
= 0.
To solve for the the recursive equilibrium, we look for policy functions, {P(n)}Nn=1 that map from
state variables
x =
⇣
A, Aˆ,K, Kˆ, b
⌘
,
to allocations and prices z given in (14), as well as the Lagrangian multipliers  , µ,  ˆ, µˆ. The
Lagrange multipliers appear in the households’ F.O.C.s to ensure that the allocations are optimal
solutions to the households’ consumption-saving/investment problems.
We initialize the policy function sequence with P(1) which corresponds to the equilibrium in
the 1-period version of the model. Assuming that we have solved for P(n), we look for P(n+1)
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by solving the system of equilibrium equations at each collocation point of the exogenous and
endogenous state variables. The system of equations involves the 20 unknowns listed above and 20
equations (F.O.C.s, market-clearing conditions, relative prices and real exchange-rate restrictions).
P(n) corresponds to the equilibrium in the n-period version of the model and the limit of {P(n)}
corresponds to the equilibrium of the infinite-horizon model.18
To accommodate the high-dimension of the problem, we resort to the adaptive sparse grid
method developed in Ma and Zabaras (2009) and recently applied in economic applications by
Brumm and Scheidegger (2017). A unique aspect of the problem is that we need to solve for
equilibria with multiple assets and portfolio choice in an environment with incomplete markets
where there is trade in both US and UK denominated bonds (Subsection 5.2). This problem
is challenging since returns to assets in certain regions of the state space are close to collinear,
requiring the Jacobian matrix of the equilibrium system to be evaluated very accurately. To tackle
this problem, we adopt an automatic differentiation method (Baydin et al., 2017) which allows
us to evaluate the Jacobian matrix up to machine precision with speed comparable to analytical
gradients.19 Nevertheless, to solve the models accurately for many different calibrations requires
intensive computation, which we undertake with numerical implementations in C++ and parallel
programing on a 48 CPU core machine.
Ergodic Distribution and Impulse Response Functions In order to compute the ergodic
distribution over the (exogenous and endogenous) state variables
x =
⇣
A, Aˆ,K, Kˆ, b
⌘
,
we simulate 100 samples for 50, 000 periods using the nonlinear policy functions
⇣
K(x), Kˆ(x),B(x)
⌘
from the RE solution.20 We drop the first 10, 000 burn-in periods from each sample. Therefore, in
total we have 4 million observations for the state variables which we use to construct the histogram
of the ergodic distribution.
18See Duffie et al. (1994) and Cao (2018, 2020) for examples of existence proofs using the limit of equilibria in
finite-horizon economies.
19We use an efficient (Jacobian) gradient-based equation solver that respects boxed bounds with an interior-point
method, following Powell (1970), Coleman and Li (1996), and Bellavia et al. (2012).
20By the Ergodic Theorem, one long sample is enough to approximate the ergodic distribution but using 100
samples allows us to parallelize the simulations.
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We use impulse response functions to understand the transmission mechanism in our model.
To compute the unconditional impulse response functions (UIRFs), we pick N = 200, 000 draws
from the ergodic distribution (the last 2, 000 draws from each of the 100 samples) and produce two
replica sets of the draws. Starting from each draw
⇣
A(n), Aˆ(n),K(n), Kˆ(n), b(n)
⌘N
n=1
in the first set, we simulate forward 100 periods (years, or quarters depending on the model).
We discretize the productivity processes in (13) using 3-point discrete Markov chains. From each
draw in the second set, we change A(n) to the highest productivity level, and simulate forward
100 periods. The impulse response of a variable of interest, among the policy variables z, is the
difference of the averages of the variable values from the two sets.
To compute the conditional impulse response functions (CIRFs), we pick a subset of N draws
that satisfies the conditionality (e.g., b lies in the bottom 5% of its marginal ergodic distribution).
Then we simulate forward the two sets of draws and calculate the difference of the averages of the
variable of interest as we do for the UIRFs.
4 The Transmission Mechanism in the Benchmark Model
In this section, we examine the transmission and propagation of productivity shocks in the
benchmark model. We first show that under most circumstances the transmission mechanism
produces initial co-movements in the real exchange rate and output that are consistent with the
empirical evidence from the US-UK data, presented in Section 1. Next, we demonstrate that a
very different transmission mechanism operates in the model when either the US or UK is close
to or at the international borrowing constraint. We then return to the US-UK data to empirically
investigate whether this alternative transmission mechanism was ever operable. We extend our
analysis to other variants of the IRBC model in Section 5.
4.1 General Transmission
According to our empirical model, shocks raising the cyclical component of US GDP produced
a real appreciation in the US dollar, whereas shocks increasing the cyclical component of UK GDP
produced a real depreciation (see Figure 2). We now compare these implications with the dynamic
responses of output and the real exchange rate to productivity shocks in the benchmark model.
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Our global method produces a set of non-linear equations that characterize the equilibrium
dynamics in the model, so the dynamic effects of productivity shocks depend on the prevailing
values of the endogenous state variables. To account for this form of state-dependency, we simulate
the equilibrium effects of the productivity shocks over 100 periods starting from 2000 values for the
endogenous state variables that are randomly chosen from their joint ergodic distribution. We then
compute the average dynamic effect of the productivity shock for each of the 100 periods across the
simulations. We refer to these averages as the Unconditional Impulse Response Functions (UIRFs)
because the dynamic effects of the productivity shocks are not conditioned on particular values of
the prevailing endogenous state variables.
Figure 4 plots the UIRFs for log US productivity, the log real exchange rate, and the logs of
US and UK output, induced by a positive US productivity shock.21 The plots show that while the
productivity shock produces an immediate and persistent rise in US output, it has minimal effects
on UK output (there is a small fall and then rise in the years following the shock). The shock also
produces an immediate real appreciation of the US dollar, followed by a persistent depreciation that
lasts for approximately 15 years. We note that the immediate effects of the productivity shock on
US output and the real exchange rate are consistent with the empirical responses in Figure 2, but
thereafter the UIRFS and empirical responses diverge. We discuss the reasons for this divergence
in Section 6.
At first glance, the immediate exchange-rate effects of productivity shocks shown in Figure 4
may seem counterintuitive. Since positive US productivity shocks increase the production of US
goods, it seems that the relative price of these goods should fall, which would be reflected in a
depreciation of the real exchange rate (see equation (12)). To uncover the flaw in this intuition, we
need to understand how productivity shocks affect the demand for US (and UK) goods. Recall that
households are prohibited from holding foreign equity, which inhibits risk-sharing. As a consequence,
productivity shocks to US firms have larger wealth effects on US households than UK households
(even though all households choose their portfolios optimally). This means that a positive US
productivity shock increases the world consumption demand for US goods relative to UK goods
in the absence of any change in relative prices (because household preferences exhibit home bias
in the consumption). Productivity shocks also affect the investment demand for goods by firms
through their impact on the marginal product of capital. In particular, because a positive shock
produces a persistent increase in US productivity (see Figure 2), it also creates a strong incentive
for US firms to increase investment when the shock occurs. In sum, therefore, the initial effect of
21The UIFR for productivity is a standard IRF because the process in (13) is linear.
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Figure 4: UIRFs for US productivity, real exchange rate, and US, UK output
Note: This figure is generated by the solution of the baseline model with parameters given in Table 2
a positive US productivity shock is to increase the demand for US goods for both consumption
and investment purposes. Of course, the productivity shock also makes existing capital (and labor)
more productive, which increases the supply of US goods. While it is possible that the higher supply
of US goods matches the increase in demand, so markets will clear without any change in relative
prices, this is not the case in our calibration of the benchmark model. Instead, the relative price
of US goods rises to reduce the consumption demand for US goods so that total demand matches
the production capacity of US firms while they undertake more investment. The real appreciation
of the dollar induced by the positive US productivity shock reflects this change in relative prices.
Figure 5 provides more information on the transmission of productivity shocks. The upper panel
plots the UIRFs for the US and UK consumption indices and US real investment. These plots show
that the real appreciation of the dollar reconciles the differing wealth effects of the productivity
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Figure 5: IRFs for US productivity, real exchange rate, and US, UK output
Note: This figure is generated by the solution of the baseline model with parameters given in Table 2
shock on US and UK households produced by incomplete risk sharing with the desire of US firms
to increase real investment. The increase in the relative price of US goods induces both US and UK
households to substitute UK goods for US goods in their consumption baskets, which facilitates
market clearing in the US goods market, but it also increases the world consumption demand
for UK goods. Since there is no immediate change in the productive capacity of UK firms, this
increase in demand must be accommodated by a fall in UK investment, as is shown by the UIRF
in the lower left-hand panel of Figure 5. This takes place because the expected increase in UK
consumption following the shock (shown in the upper left-hand plot) raises the required real return
on UK capital. Thus, in effect, the appreciation of the real exchange rate facilitates a shift in the
pattern of international real investment towards US production and away from UK production.22
22It is clear from the discussion that if US firms can substitute UK goods for US goods when undertaking investment
in their capital stock, as assumed in Backus et al. (1993) and the subsequent literature, then our transmission
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The US productivity shock also has implications for trade flows and the US NFA position (bt 1
in the US budget constraint (7b)). In particular, the initial higher consumption of UK goods by
US households produces a US trade deficit and a deterioration in the US NFA position. This is
shown by the UIRF for the US NFA position plotted in the lower panel of Figure 5. Then, as US
investment falls relative to output, the real exchange rate depreciates and consumption shifts back
towards US goods, producing a US trade surplus. As the plot shows, these trade surpluses generate
an improvement in the US NFA position that lasts approximately twenty years.
The response of the US NFA position in Figure 5 also makes clear that in order to garner the
full benefit of a US productivity shock, US households must be able to borrow internationally,
or equivalently run a trade deficit. Because the UIRFs in Figures 4 and 5 are average responses
computed from the entire ergodic distribution of the endogenous state variables, they do not reflect
the transmission of productivity shocks when the US NFA position is close to the lower bound of
the ergodic distribution shown in Figure 3. We consider this in the next Subsection.
4.2 Transmission Near the Borrowing Constraint
In order to study the effects of US productivity shocks when US households are near their
international borrowing limit, we need to compute a second set of impulse response functions. For
this purpose, we again simulate the equilibrium effects of the productivity shocks over 100 periods
starting from 2000 values for the endogenous state variables but now they are randomly chosen from
a portion of their joint ergodic distribution where the US NFA position lies in the fifth percentile of
its marginal distribution. We then compute the average dynamic effect of the productivity shock
for each of the 100 periods across the simulations. We refer to these averages as the Conditional
Impulse Response Functions (CIRFs) because the dynamic effects of the productivity shocks are
conditioned on US households being in the proximity of their international borrowing constraint.
Figure 6 plots the CIRFs and the UIRFs for log output, the log real exchange rate, the US NFA
position and log consumption induced by a positive US productivity shock. The plots in the upper
left-hand panel show that proximity to the borrowing constraint does not significantly affect how
US productivity shocks affect either US or UK output. In particular, there are no visible differences
between the CIRF and UIRF for US output up to five years following the shock. In contrast, the
upper right-hand panel shows that proximity to the borrowing limit changes the impact of the
mechanism is weakened. Backus et al. (1993) assume that investment goods have exactly the same home-bias
and substitution patterns as consumption goods. However, Burstein et al. (2004) find that investment goods have
very different domestic-imported contents from consumption goods. Our model features this dissimilarity between
investment and consumption.
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Figure 6: IRFs for US productivity, real exchange rate, and US, UK output
Note: This figure is generated by the solution of the baseline model with parameters given in Table 2. The solid
lines are UIRFs and the dashed lines are CIRFs, conditional on US NFA being in the fifth percentile of its marginal
distribution.
shock on the real exchange rate; producing an initial real depreciation of the US dollar rather than
an appreciation. The plot also shows that proximity to the borrowing constraint dampens the real
exchange-rate response over the next ten years.
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To understand why the exchange rate effects of the productivity shock are so different in the
proximity of borrowing constraint, recall that at prevailing relative prices, the initial effect of the
shock is to increases consumption and investment demand for US goods beyond the productivity
capacity of US firms. When US households are able to borrow internationally, markets clear because
the relative price of US goods rises so that US households substitute UK for US goods in their
consumption basket. Since this adjustment mechanism produces a US trade deficit, it is inoperable
when US households are at the borrowing constraint. Instead, US households are restricted from
consuming more UK goods that cannot be purchased from the proceeds of higher US exports
to the UK. The relative price of UK goods must rise to reconcile this balanced trade restriction
with the wealth effect of the productivity shock on US households. The middle panel of Figure
6 shows that the shock produces an increase in US households’ composite consumption via the
wealth effect, so US households need to shift the composition of their consumption basket from
UK to US goods to avoid running a trade deficit. Of course, this shift means that less of the
prevailing productive capacity of US firms is available for real investment, so the higher demand
for US investment produced by the productivity shock must be tempered by an increase in the
required return on capital. These effects can be seen by comparing the CIFR and UIFR for US
investment and consumption in the middle panel of Figure 6. The productivity shock induces a
smaller increase in US investment and higher growth in US consumption. The lower panel of Figure
6 shows two further implications. First, the initial fall in UK investment is reduced because the
borrowing constraint limits export demand.23 Second, the international borrowing constraint stops
the US NFA position from falling in the immediate aftermath of the shock and dampens its rise in
subsequent years. Indeed, a comparison of the CIRFs and UIRFs for US consumption and the NFA
position makes clear that proximity to the international borrowing constraint limits the ability of
US households to inter-temporally smooth consumption.
In summary, our analysis shows that the transmission mechanism for productivity shocks de-
pends critically on the ability of a country benefiting from the shock to borrow internationally.
When there are no restrictions on further borrowing, the exchange rate moves to facilitate the
international reallocation of investment to its most productive use, but when further borrowing is
restricted, the real exchange rate moves to mitigate the effects of the restriction on welfare.
23The appreciation of the dollar also lowers the value of UK bond holdings, so that the wealth effect of the
productivity shock on UK households is smaller; see the CIRF and UIRF for UK composite consumption in the
middle panel of Figure 6.
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4.3 Empirical Evidence
We now return to the US-UK data to investigate whether the co-movements of GDP and the
real exchange rate vary according to the proximity of either country to its international borrowing
limit. For this purpose, we examine whether the coefficients in the empirical model of equations
(3) and (4) differ in years with banking crises. More precisely, we construct a dummy variable st
that equals one in years when there is either a US or UK banking crisis, based on the chronology in
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, Table A.3). We then re-estimate equations (3) and (4) allowing for the
coefficients to vary with st. In the case of the cyclical GDP equations (4), there was no statistically
significant evidence of state-dependency in any of the coefficients. However, in the case of the real
depreciation rate equation (3), there are statistically significant differences in all the coefficients
between crisis and non-crisis years.
Panel I of Table 4 reports the estimates of the depreciation equation (3) allowing for the effects
of crises. The coefficient estimates in the left-hand column, computed in years without a crisis, are
similar to those in Table 1. In particular, these estimates imply that in the absence of a banking
crisis, shocks that raise US GDP tend to also produce a real appreciation of the US dollar, whereas
shocks that increase UK GDP produce a real depreciation. These contemporaneous co-movements
are consistent with the initial UIRFs implied by our theoretical model (see Figure 4). The right-
hand column reports the estimated difference between the coefficients in crisis and non-crisis years.
As the table shows, all of these differences are statistically significant at conventional levels. The
immediate exchange-rate effects of a shock in a crisis are determined by the sum of the coefficients
in each row. These estimated coefficients imply that shocks producing an increase in USD GDP
induce a real depreciation of the dollar, and shocks increasing UK GDP are accompanied by a
real appreciation. Again, these co-movements are consistent with the initial CIRFs implied by the
model when a country is close to its international borrowing limit (see Figure 6).
The estimates in Table 4 also have implications for the persistence of co-movements in cyclical
GDP and the real exchange rate because the coefficients on the error-correction term differ signif-
icantly between crisis and no-crisis years. To appreciate these effects, Figure 7 plots the dynamic
response of the log real exchange rate to shocks that increase cyclical US and UK GDP in crisis
and non-crisis years. The responses in non-crisis years are similar to those in Figure 2. The initial
impact of a shock is amplified for a couple of years, and then dissipates slowly. The response pat-
terns are quite different in crisis years. Not only are the initial exchange-rate effects of the shock
reversed (i.e., depreciations replace appreciations, and vise versa), but there is no amplification and
the effects die more quickly.
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Table 4: State-Dependent Model Estimates
I: Estimates Real Depreciation Rate Equation: ∆"
No Crisis Difference in Crisis
Regressors
yCycle (US) -0.294⇤ 0.806⇤⇤
(0.155) (0.386)
yˆCycle (UK) 0.609⇤⇤⇤ -1.702⇤⇤⇤
(0.163) (0.589)
gap -0.148⇤⇤⇤ -0.313⇤⇤⇤
(0.034) (0.097)
SEE 0.063
R2 0.183
II: Variance Contribution Horizon (years)
1. 5. 10. 15. 20.
GDP Contribution 0.068 0.185 0.234 0.201 0.149
(standard error) (0.021) (0.026) (0.032) (0.038) (0.026)
Trend GDP Contribution 0.009 0.032 0.075 0.091 0.072
(standard error) (0.006) (0.012) (0.018) (0.027) (0.023)
Notes: Panel I reports estimates of the real depreciation rate equation
∆εt =
 ⇥
β1 β2
⇤
+
⇥
βdiff1 β
diff
2
⇤
st
   yCyclet
yˆCyclet
 
+ [γ + γdiffst]gapt−1 + et,
where βdiff1 ,β
diff
2 and γ
diff identify the difference in the corresponding coefficient between crisis and non-crisis
years. The left-hand column reports OLS estimates of β1, β2 and γ, and the right-hand column reports
estimates of βdiff1 ,β
diff
2 and γ
diff . Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. Estimates are computed
from annual data 1802-2016 (215 observations). Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels is indicated
by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively. Panel II reports the estimated contribution of US and UK GDP (trend and
cyclical components) to the variance of the real depreciation rate over horizons from one to 20 years, and
the variance contributions of the trend components in US and UK GDP alone. See footnote 10 for details.
Crises do not appear to materially affect how the cyclical and trend components of GDP con-
tributed to the variance of the depreciation rates across different horizons. Panel II of Table 4
reports the variance contributions of GDP to depreciation rates allowing for the effects of crises.
These estimated contributions are similar to those in Table 1. Even though the exchange-rate
implications of shocks differ between crisis and non-crisis years, crisis occur relatively infrequently
(crisis years cover only seven percent of the sample period), so the variance decompositions largely
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Figure 7: Conditional Real Exchange Rate Responses
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Notes: The figure plots the dynamic response of the log real exchange rate to a shock that induces a one
percent increase in either yCyclet (US) or yˆ
Cycle
t (UK). Solid plots for responses in no-crisis years, dashed plots
for crisis years.
reflect the co-movements in GDP and depreciation rates in non-crisis years.
In summary, the estimates in Table 1 and plots in Figure 4 clearly show that co-movements in the
US-UK real exchange rate and US and UK GDP over the past two centuries have differed according
to whether one or both countries were experiencing a banking crisis. We interpret these findings to
be broadly consistent with the results of our theoretical analysis under the reasonable assumption
that banking crises in either the US or UK impaired international borrowing and lending.
5 Is the Transmission Mechanism Robust?
To this point, we have examined the transmission mechanism for productivity shocks in a
particular specification of the IRBC model. In this section, we study the transmission mechanism in
several different specifications in order to identify the key features of IRBC models that are needed
for the mechanism to operate. We also investigate how these features contribute to resolutions of
the widely-studied Backus-Smith puzzle.
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5.1 Alternative Calibrations of the Benchmark Model
We begin our investigation by considering alternative calibrations of our benchmark specifica-
tion. In particular, we examine the robustness of the transmission mechanism to different degrees
of persistence in productivity, and different elasticities of substitution between US and UK goods
in households’ preferences.
Productivity Persistence We solved the benchmark model for a range of values for the persis-
tence parameter ⇢ (with other parameters unchanged), and computed the UIRFs to a positive US
productivity shock from each solution. The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 8, where
we plot the initial UIRF for the real exchange rate against the persistence parameter ⇢. Here we
see that positive US productivity shocks only produce an initial real appreciation of the dollar in
calibrations where the persistence parameter ⇢ is above 0.6; when shocks have less persistence, they
produce a real depreciation of the dollar.
The persistence of productivity shocks plays a key role in the transmission mechanism because
it has a significant impact on US firms’ investment decisions: Ceteris paribus, firms will want to
invest less when positive productivity shocks have low persistence. Under these circumstances,
Figure 8: Varying Productivity Persistence
Notes: The figure plots the initial UIRF for the real exchange rate against the persistent
of productivity computed from the solutions to alternative calibrations of the benchmark
IRBC model with differing persistence parameters.
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when the shock hits the prevailing productive capacity of US firms can exceed the investment and
consumption demand for US goods so the relative price of US goods falls to clear markets, which
is reflected in a real depreciation of the dollar. Appendix A.1 provides a more detailed discussion
of the transmission mechanism when productivity is less persistent, including a comparison of the
UIRFs with our benchmark specification.
Elasticity of Substitution We undertook an analogous exercise to investigate the role played by
the elasticity of substitution between US and UK goods in households’ preferences, ✓. In this case
we computed the UIRFs from solutions of the benchmark model for a range of values for ✓. Figure
9 plots the initial UIRF for the real exchange rate against the elasticity parameter ✓. Here we see
that positive US productivity shocks produce a real appreciation of the dollar in the calibrations of
the model with ✓ above 6; and a real depreciation when the elasticity of substitution is lower.
The elasticity of substitution plays a key role in the transmission mechanism because it affects
the willingness of US households to alter the composition of their consumption baskets. In our
benchmark specification (where ✓ = 10), UK goods are good substitutes of US goods, so a small
fall in the relative price of UK goods is sufficient to induce households to consume proportionately
more UK goods in response to the productivity shock, which facilitates market-clearing when US
real investment is high. This mechanism breaks down when the elasticity of substitution is below
a certain level because the required change in relative prices is so large that it deters US real
investment via its effect on the marginal product of capital.24 Instead, the transmission mechanism
appears to operate as though US households are close to the international borrowing constraint.
When UK goods are poor substitutes for US goods, US households react to the productivity shock
as if they were facing a borrowing constraint that limited the increase in their consumption of UK
goods. As we show in Appendix A.2, the UIRFs in an equilibrium with low elasticity (✓ = 2) are
very similar to the CIRFs in Figure 6 .
5.2 Alternatives to the Benchmark Model
Next, we next investigate how the transmission mechanism operates in IRBC models that have
more substantial differences with our benchmark specification. In particular, we consider models
24The first-order condition for US investment is given by
Et
"
β
λt+1
λt
pUSt+1
pUSt
⇣
ηAt+1K
η−1
t+1 + 1− δ
⌘
− 1
#
= 0.
If a productivity shock induces a very large rise in the relative price of US goods, pUSt+1/p
US
t falls, which can offset
the effects of the shock on productivity, At+1.
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Figure 9: Varying Elasticity of Substitution
Notes: The figure plots the initial UIRF for the real exchange rate against the elasticity of
substitution θ computed from the solutions to alternative calibrations of the benchmark
IRBC model with differing elasticity parameters.
with different financial market structures, production technologies and productivity processes.
Financial Market Structure Our benchmark model only allows for international asset trade in
a single bond. As a result, markets are incomplete and risk-sharing between US and UK households
is impaired. To this point, we have not emphasized how incomplete risk-sharing contributes to the
transmission mechanism other than to point out that it produces different wealth effects across
US and UK households. To investigate how the degree of risk-sharing affects the transmission
mechanism, we considered solutions to three variants on our benchmark specification: one with
complete markets, one with financial autarky, and one where households can trade two bonds
internationally. In the two bond model, households face a more substantive portfolio choice problem
of allocating their wealth between domestic equity, US bonds and UK bonds. A complete description
of these models can be found in Appendix B.
The upper panel of Figure 10 plots the UIRFs of output and the real exchange rate from a
positive US productivity shock for the benchmark model and the three variants. These plots
show that the degree of risk-sharing has small effects on the behavior of output. The UIRFs are
essentially indistinguishable between the models with international trade in one or two bonds or
complete markets. Under financial autarky, US productivity shocks have more persistent effects
on US output and minimal effects on UK output. The UIRFs also show that the impact of the
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shock on the real exchange rate is similar in the models with complete markets and international
asset trade (with one or two bonds); there is an initial real appreciation of the dollar followed by
a period of depreciation that lasts approximately 15 years. In contrast, there is an initial real
depreciation of the dollar in the model with financial autarky, which persists for a very long time.
These differences show that the ability to borrow and lend internationally is more important than
the degree of risk-sharing per se. Indeed, the initial response of the exchange rate under financial
autarky is very similar to the response we examined in the benchmark model when US households
were close to the international borrowing limit.
Risk-sharing has larger effects on the behavior of consumption. As the lower panel of Figure 10
shows, there are significant differences between the UIRFs for US and UK consumption across the
Figure 10: Different Financial Market Structures
Note: This figure is generated by the solution of the baseline model with parameters given in Table 2 under different
financial market structures: complete markets, incomplete markets with one or two bonds, and financial autarky.
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models with financial autarky, incomplete markets (with one or two bonds) and complete markets.
Under financial autarky, the effects of the US productivity shock are almost entirely confined to
US consumption because the real depreciation of the dollar keeps the US demand for UK goods
essentially unchanged. Productivity shocks have similar effects on US and UK consumption in the
models with international asset trade in one or two bonds. In both models, the initial effect of the
shock is to increase US consumption more than UK consumption because the wealth effects are
concentrated in US equity. In the complete markets model, the wealth effects of the productivity
shock are more evenly distributed between US and UK households, so the shock has a smaller
(larger) initial impact on US (UK) consumption than when markets are incomplete. Although the
UIRFs for US and UK consumption appear very similar, in reality, UK consumption initially rises
by more than US consumption, for reasons we discuss below.
The plots in Figure 10 make clear that the co-movements in output and the real exchange rate
produced by productivity shocks are generally robust to the degree of international risk-sharing.
Away from the international borrowing constraint (and financial autarky), positive US productivity
shocks produce a real appreciation in the dollar and an increase in US output under complete or in-
complete risk-sharing. In contrast, our analysis also reveals that co-movements in the real exchange
rate and consumption depend on the degree of risk-sharing. When risk-sharing is impaired (i.e., in
either the one or two bond models), positive US productivity shocks induce a real appreciation and
a rise in US consumption relative to UK consumption. More generally, in our benchmark specifi-
cation productivity shocks induce a negative correlation between the real depreciation rate ∆"t+1
and relative consumption growth ∆ lnCt+1 −∆ ln Cˆt+1 equal to -0.208. This implied correlation is
similar to the estimated correlation of −0.39 documented in Corsetti et al. (2008) using recent US
and UK annual data. Of course, as Backus and Smith (1993) originally stressed, the correlation is
one under complete markets.
Figure 11 provides a perspective on why the consumption responses to productive shocks differ
in the models with complete and incomplete markets. The figure plots the UIRFs for the US NFA
position in the model with complete markets and in the models with one and two internationally
traded bonds. Here we see that a positive US productivity shock has little impact on the US NFA
position in the models with incomplete markets.25 So the wealth effects of the shock originate
from the capital gains of households’ domestic equity holdings. In the complete market model, the
25In the benchmark model, NFA positions are defined in terms of US bond holdings, so an appreciation of the
real exchange rate implies a capital gain on UK NFA, but has no effect on US NFA. In the two bond model, an
appreciation of the real exchange rate represents a capital loss on US holdings of UK bonds, and a capital gain on
UK holdings of US bonds. The UIRF for US NFA shows that these valuation effects are typically very small.
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Figure 11: NFA UIRFs under complete and incomplete markets
Note: This figure is generated by the solution of the baseline model with parameters given in Table
2 under different financial market structures: complete markets, incomplete markets with one or
two bonds. Under financial autarky, US NFA is always zero so we omit it from the figure.
productivity shock lowers the US NFA position, which dampens the wealth effect on US households,
and amplifies the effect on UK households.26 Intuitively, households hold a portfolio of state-
contingent securities that provides a hedge against adverse domestic productivity shocks (because
there is home bias in consumption), so US households enjoy a smaller capital gain in response to
positive US productivity shocks than UK households. As a consequence, the shock produces a
larger increase in UK consumption than US consumption, as we noted in our discussion of Figure
10.
Our results demonstrate that the joint dynamics of consumption and real exchange rate depend
on whether international trade in assets allows for complete risk-sharing or not. This point is also
emphasized in Corsetti et al. (2008). Benigno and Kucuk (2012) argue (in the context of the Corsetti
et al.’s model) that the sign of the Backus-Smith correlation between the real depreciation rate and
relative consumption growth depends on whether one or two bonds are traded internationally. In
contrast, we find that differences in the degree of risk-sharing produced by expanding the number
of internationally traded bonds have little effect on the Backus-Smith correlation. Rather, the key
factors affecting the correlation are the persistence of productivity shocks ⇢ and the elasticity of
26Under complete markets, households trade state-contingent Arrow securities which pay off depending on the
realization of productivity shocks. The US NFA position is defined as the ex-post payoff of US households’ Arrow
security portfolio. The exact notation and definition are given in Appendix B.
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substitution ✓. This can be clearly seen in Figure 12 which plots the correlation against ⇢ and ✓
computed from alternative calibrations of the benchmark specification.
Figure 12: Backus-Smith Correlation
Notes: The figure plots the correlation between the relative consumption growth and real deprecation rate, computed
from the solutions to alternative calibrations of the benchmark IRBC model, against the persistence of productivity
shock ρ (left panel) and elasticity of substitution θ (right panel).
Production and Investment Firms’ investment decisions play a central role in the transmission
mechanism we have described. To further emphasize this point, we considered a variant of the
benchmark model that eliminates investment decisions and fixes each firm’s capital stock at its
steady-state value. Appendix C reports the UIRFs from US productivity shocks under complete
markets, international asset trade in one and two bonds, and financial autarky. Under all these
different market structures, positive US productivity shocks raise US output and produce a real
depreciation of the dollar. These results confirm that (away from the international borrowing
constraint) the real exchange rate plays a central role in facilitating the international allocation of
real investment.
Productivity When markets are incomplete, the effects of productivity shocks may well depend
on the correlation of shocks across countries and whether they have persistent (unit root) effects on
the level of productivity. We considered two variants of the benchmark model to investigate these
possibilities. In the first variant we replace the productivity process in (13) with the stationary
bi-variate process for logAt and log Aˆt estimated in Heathcote and Perri (2002) that allows for
cross-country correlation in productivity shocks. In the second variant we assumed that logAt and
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log Aˆt follow co-integrated unit-root process as in Rabanal et al. (2011). Appendix D provides a
detail description and analysis of these models.
We find that our main results concerning the correlations between real depreciation rates and
output (and consumption) are robust to the presence of cross-country correlations or unit-roots
across the different market structures considered above. We also find that productivity shocks
have more persistent effects on the real exchange rate and the US NFA position in models with a
unit-root process. This can be seen in Figure 13 where we plot the UIRFS for these variables under
different market structures.27 Under incomplete markets, positive US productivity shocks produce
an initial real appreciation of the dollar that lasts for 2 years, and a deterioration in the US NFA
position that lasts for 10 years. This is closer to the degree of persistence we find in the empirical
model (see Figure 7).
Figure 13: UIRFs with Co-integrated Unit-Root Productivity Processes
6 Conclusions
This paper has examined how medium-term movements in real exchange rates and GDP vary
with international financial conditions. Empirically, we have shown that shocks producing cyclical
variations in GDP account for a significant fraction of the real US-UK depreciation rate over
horizons ranging from five to fifteen years. We then showed that productivity shocks can induce
co-movements in the real exchange rates, GDP and consumption that are consistent with the
27The model is in quarterly frequency, to be consistent with the estimation in Rabanal et al. (2011), but we display
the UIRFs in annual frequency to make it visually comparable to the UIRFs from the baseline (annual) model.
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data in a variety of IRBC models. One important finding to emerge from this analysis is that
the co-movements depend on prevailing financial conditions; more specifically the proximity of a
country to its international borrowing constraint. We find evidence consistent with this form of
state-dependency in the US-UK data.
Unfortunately, the IRBC models we study do not account for all the features of the data. In
particular, a common feature of every model is that the initial effects of productivity shocks on both
real exchange rates and NFA positions are subsequently reversed. There is no evidence of these
reversals in the US-UK data. In a sense this short-coming of IRBC models is not a surprise; there is
no empirical evidence that shocks affecting the US NFA positions are subsequently reversed either
(see, e.g., Evans, 2017). We conjecture that whatever economic mechanisms weaken mean-reversion
in the US NFA position also inhibits the reversals in the exchange-rate effects of productivity
shocks.28
References
Backus, D., P. Kehoe, and F. Kydland (1993). International business cycles: Theory vs. evidence.
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review .
Backus, D. K., P. J. Kehoe, and F. E. Kydland (1992). International real business cycles. Journal
of Political Economy 100 (4), 745–775.
Backus, D. K. and G. W. Smith (1993). Consumption and real exchange rates in dynamic economies
with non-traded goods. Journal of International Economics 35 (3), 297 – 316.
Balassa, B. (1964). The purchasing-power parity doctrine: A reappraisal. Journal of Political
Economy 72 (6), 584–596.
Baxter, M. and M. J. Crucini (1995). Business cycles and the asset structure of foreign trade.
International Economic Review 36 (4), 821–854.
Baydin, A. G., B. A. Pearlmutter, A. A. Radul, and J. M. Siskind (2017). Automatic differentiation
in machine learning: a survey. The Journal of Machine Learning Research 18 (1), 5595–5637.
Publisher: JMLR. org.
28This conjecture is confirmed in the alternative version of the benchmark model with co-integrated random walk
productivity processes discussed in Subsection 5.2.
40
Bellavia, S., M. Macconi, and S. Pieraccini (2012). Constrained Dogleg Methods for nonlinear
systems with simple bounds. Computational Optimization and Applications 53 (3), 771–794.
Benigno, G. and H. Kucuk (2012). Portfolio allocation and international risk sharing. Canadian
Journal of Economics 45, 535–565.
Benigno, G. and C. Thoenissen (2008). Consumption and real exchange rates with incomplete
markets and non-traded goods. Journal of International Money and Finance 27 (6), 926 – 948.
Bodenstein, M. (2008). International asset markets and real exchange rate volatility. Review of
Economic Dynamics 11 (3), 688 – 705.
Brumm, J. and S. Scheidegger (2017). Using adaptive sparse grids to solve high-dimensional dy-
namic models. Econometrica 85 (5), 1575–1612.
Burstein, A. T., J. C. Neves, and S. Rebelo (2004, 05). Investment Prices and Exchange Rates:
Some Basic Facts. Journal of the European Economic Association 2 (2-3), 302–309.
Cao, D. (2010). Collateral shortages, asset price and investment volatility with heterogeneous
beliefs. Georgetown University Working Paper.
Cao, D. (2018). Speculation and financial wealth distribution under belief heterogeneity. The
Economic Journal 218, 2258–81.
Cao, D. (2020). Recursive equilibrium in Krusell and Smith (1998). Journal of Economic The-
ory 186.
Cao, D. and G. Nie (2017). Amplification and asymmetric effects without collateral constraints.
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 9 (3), 222–66.
Cashin, P., L. F. Céspedes, and R. Sahay (2004). Commodity currencies and the real exchange
rate. Journal of Development Economics 75 (1), 239–268.
Chen, Y. and K. Rogoff (2003). Commodity currencies. Journal of International Economics 60 (1),
133–160.
Coeurdacier, N. and P.-O. Gourinchas (2008). When bonds matter: Home bias in goods and assets.
Working Paper Series 2008-25, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
Coeurdacier, N., R. Kollmann, and P. Martin (2010). International portfolios, capital accumulation
and foreign assets dynamics. Journal of International Economics 80 (1), 100–112.
41
Coeurdacier, N. and H. Rey (2012). Home bias in open economy financial macroeconomics. Journal
of Economic Literature 51 (1), 63–115.
Coeurdacier, N., H. Rey, and P. Winant (2019). Financial integration and growth in a risky world.
Journal of Monetary Economics.
Colacito, R. and M. M. Croce (2013). International asset pricing with recursive preferences. Journal
of Finance 68 (6), 2651–2686.
Coleman, T. F. and Y. Li (1996). An interior trust region approach for nonlinear minimization
subject to bounds. SIAM Journal on optimization 6 (2), 418–445.
Coleman, W. J. (1990). Solving the stochastic growth model by policy-function iteration. Journal
of Business & Economic Statistics 8 (1), 27–29.
Corsetti, G., L. Dedola, and S. Leduc (2008, 04). International Risk Sharing and the Transmission
of Productivity Shocks. The Review of Economic Studies 75 (2), 443–473.
De Gregorio, J., A. Giovannini, and H. C. Wolf (1994). International evidence on tradables and
nontradables inflation. European Economic Review 38 (6), 1225–1244.
Devereux, M. B. and A. Sutherland (2010). Country portfolio dynamics. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control 34 (7), 1325 – 1342.
Duffie, D., J. Geanakoplos, A. Mas-Colell, and A. McLennan (1994). Stationary markov equilibria.
Econometrica 62 (4), 745–781.
Edwards, S. and J. D. Ostry (1990). Anticipated protectionist policies, real exchange rates, and
the current account: the case of rigid wages. Journal of International Money and Finance 9 (2),
206–219.
Edwards, S. and M. Savastano (2000). Exchange Rates in Emerging Economies: What Do We
Know? What Do We Need to Know?, pp. 453–510. Economic Policy Reform: The Second Stage.
Chicago University Press.
Engel, C., N. C. Mark, and K. D. West (2008). Exchange rate models are not as bad as you think.
In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2007, Volume 22, pp. 381–441. University of Chicago Press.
Engel, C. and A. Matsumoto (2009). The international diversification puzzle when goods prices
are sticky: It’s really about exchange-rate hedging, not equity portfolios. American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics 1 (2), 155–88.
42
Evans, M. D. (2014). Risk, external adjustment and capital flows. Journal of International Eco-
nomics 92, S68–S93.
Evans, M. D. (2017). External balances, trade and financial conditions. Journal of International
Economics 107, 165 – 184.
Evans, M. D. D. and V. Hnatkovska (2012). A method for solving general equilibrium models
with incomplete markets and many financial assets. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Con-
trol 36 (12), 1909 – 1930.
Froot, K. A. and K. Rogoff (1995). Perspectives on ppp and long-run real exchange rates. Handbook
of international economics 3, 1647–1688.
Gabaix, X. and M. Maggiori (2015, 03). International liquidity and exchange rate dynamics. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 130 (3), 1369–1420.
Galstyan, V. and P. R. Lane (2009). The composition of government spending and the real exchange
rate. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 41 (6), 1233–1249.
Ghironi, F., J. Lee, and A. Rebucci (2009). The valuation channel of external adjustment. IMF
Working Papers 09/275, International Monetary Fund.
Goldfajn, I. and R. O. Valdes (1999). The aftermath of appreciations. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 114 (1), 229–262.
Harrod, R. (1933). International economics. London: Nisbet, and Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press; New York: Harcourt and Brace.
Heathcote, J. and F. Perri (2002). Financial autarky and international business cycles. Journal of
Monetary Economics 49 (3), 601 – 627.
Hnatkovska, V. (2009). Home bias and high turnover: Dynamic portfolio choice with incomplete
markets. Journal of International Economics, 113–128.
Itskhoki, O. and D. Mukhin (2017). Exchange rate disconnect in general equilibrium. Working
Paper 23401, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Judd, K. L., F. Kubler, and K. Schmedders (2000). Computing equilibria in infinite-horizon finance
economies: The case of one asset. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 24 (5), 1047 –
1078.
43
Kehoe, P. J. and F. Perri (2002). International business cycles with endogenous incomplete markets.
Econometrica 70 (3), 907–928.
Kollmann, R. (1995). Consumption, real exchange rates and the structure of international asset
markets. Journal of International Money and Finance 14 (2), 191 – 211.
Kollmann, R. (2012). Limited asset market participation and the consumption-real exchange rate
anomaly. Canadian Journal of Economics 45 (2), 566–584.
Kollmann, R. (2016). International business cycles and risk sharing with uncertainty shocks and
recursive preferences. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 72, 115 – 124.
Lothian, J. R. and M. P. Taylor (1996). Real exchange rate behavior: The recent float from the
perspective of the past two centuries. Journal of Political Economy 104 (3), 488–509.
Lothian, J. R. and M. P. Taylor (2008). Real exchange rates over the past two centuries: how
important is the harrod-balassa-samuelson effect? The Economic Journal 118 (532), 1742–1763.
Ma, X. and N. Zabaras (2009). An adaptive hierarchical sparse grid collocation algorithm for the
solution of stochastic differential equations. Journal of Computational Physics 228 (8), 3084–3113.
Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoff (2000). The six major puzzles in international macroeconomics: Is
there a common cause? NBER Macroeconomics Annual 15, 339–390.
Ostry, J. D. (1994). Government purchases and relative prices in a two-country world. Economic
Record 70 (209), 149–161.
Powell, M. J. D. (1970). A Fortran Subroutine for Solving Systems of Nonlinear Algebraic Equations.
In P. Rabinowitz (Ed.), Numerical Methods for Nonlinear Algebraic Equations.
Rabanal, P. and J. F. Rubio-Ramírez (2015). Can international macroeconomic models explain
low-frequency movements of real exchange rates? Journal of International Economics 96 (1), 199
– 211.
Rabanal, P., J. F. Rubio-Ramirez, and V. Tuesta (2011). Cointegrated tfp processes and interna-
tional business cycles. Journal of Monetary Economics 58 (2), 156 – 171.
Rabitsch, K., S. Stepanchuk, and V. Tsyrennikov (2015). International portfolios: A comparison of
solution methods. Journal of International Economics 97 (2), 404–422.
44
Reinhart, C. M. and K. S. Rogoff (2008). This time is different: A panoramic view of eight centuries
of financial crises. Working Paper 13882, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Ricci, L. A., G. M. Milesi-Ferretti, and J. Lee (2013). Real exchange rates and fundamentals: A
cross-country perspective. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 45 (5), 845–865.
Rouillard, J.-F. (2018). International risk sharing and financial shocks. Journal of International
Money and Finance 82, 26 – 44.
Samuelson, P. A. (1964). Theoretical notes on trade problems. The Review of Economics and
Statistics 46 (2), 145–154.
Stepanchuk, S. and V. Tsyrennikov (2015). Portfolio and welfare consequences of debt market
dominance. Journal of Monetary Economics 74, 89 – 101.
Stock, J. H. and M. W. Watson (1993). A simple estimator of cointegrating vectors in higher order
integrated systems. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , 783–820.
The Maddison Project (2018). Maddison historical statistics. https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/
historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison-project-database-2018, Last ac-
cessed on 2019-12-15.
Tille, C. and E. van Wincoop (2010). International capital flows. Journal of International Eco-
nomics 80 (2), 157–175.
Tretvoll, H. (2018). Real exchange variability in a two-country business cycle model. Review of
Economic Dynamics 27, 123–145.
45
APPENDIX
A Alternative Calibrations
In this appendix, we study how the model predictions depend on productivity persistence and
the elasticity of substitution.
A.1 Less Persistent Productivity Shocks
Figure 14 shows the UIRFs for equilibrium variables upon a positive productivity shock to
the US. The shock is less persistent, (⇢ = 0.2, dashed red lines) than the benchmark calibration
(⇢ = 0.82, solid black lines). In this case, the real exchange rate depreciates, rather than appreciates
as in the benchmark model. One reason is that investment in the US increases by much less than it
does under the benchmark calibration. The increase in investment demand is not enough to offset
the increase in the supply of US goods.
A.2 Lower Elasticity of Substitution
Figure 15 shows the UIRFs for equilibrium variables upon a positive productivity shock to the
US. The elasticity of substitution is lower, ✓ = 2, (dashed red lines) than the benchmark calibration
(✓ = 10, solid black lines). Again, in this case, the real exchange rate depreciates. One reason is that
investment in the US increases by less than it does under the benchmark calibration. In addition,
US consumption increases by less. UK consumption increases by more but because of consumption
home bias, this increase does not lead to a large increase in the demand of UK households for US
goods. As a result, the increase in the demand for US goods is outweighed by the increase in the
supply of US goods and, hence, the real exchange rate depreciates.
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Figure 14: UIRFs under Different Values of Productivity Persistence
Note: This figure is generated by the solution of the baseline model with parameters given in Table 2 (solid lines)
and the solution of the baseline model but with less persistent productivity shocks (dashed lines).
47
Figure 15: UIRFs under Different Values of Elasticity of Substitution
Note: This figure is generated by the solution of the baseline model with parameters given in Table 2 (solid lines)
and the solution of the baseline model but with a lower elasticity of substitution (dashed lines).
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B Alternative Market Structures
In this appendix, we examine the equilibrium dynamics under different financial market struc-
tures: complete markets, incomplete markets with one or two bonds, and financial autarky. Under
financial autarky, US and UK households can trade in the good markets but not in financial markets.
Therefore, the current account must be zero at all times.
B.1 Complete Markets
Under complete markets, households have access to the complete set of state-contingent Arrow
securities, besides domestic equity. At time t and history zt, let QAt (zt+1|z
t) denote the price of the
Arrow security that pays off one US dollar at t + 1 if and only if state zt+1 is realized. Similarly
let QˆAt (zt+1|z
t) denote the price of the Arrow security that pays off one UK pound at t+ 1 if and
only if state zt+1 is realized. To simplify notation, we omit the history dependence. It follows from
no-arbitrage that
QˆAt (zt+1) = Q
A
t (zt+1)St+1(zt+1)/St.
Given the Arrow securities and prices, US households’ budget constraint, (7a), becomes
PtCt +Qt t +
X
zt+1
QAt (zt+1)At(zt+1) ≤ (Dt +Qt) t 1 +At 1(zt) +WtLt,
where At(zt+1)’s are the holdings of state-contingent Arrow securities which payoff in US dollar.
Let at 1 =
At−1(zt)
Pt
denote the real holding and qAt+1(zt+1) = Q
A
t (zt+1)
Pt+1(zt+1)
Pt
denote the real
price of Arrow securities. The US households’ budget constraint can be written in real terms:
Ct + qt t +
X
zt+1
qAt+1(zt+1)at(zt+1) ≤ (dt + qt) t 1 + at 1(zt) + wtLt.
The US NFA at time t is defined as at 1(zt).
Similar, UK households’ budget constraint, (10a), becomes
PˆtCˆt + Qˆt ˆt +
X
zt+1
QˆAt (zt+1)Aˆt(zt+1) ≤
⇣
Dˆt + Qˆt
⌘
 ˆt 1 + Aˆt 1(zt) + WˆtLˆt,
where Aˆt(zt+1)’s are the holdings of state-contingent Arrow securities which payoff in UK pounds
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and (10b) becomes
Cˆt + qˆt ˆt +
X
zt+1
qˆAt (zt+1)aˆt(zt+1) ≤
⇣
dˆt + qˆt
⌘
 ˆt 1 + aˆt 1(zt) + wˆtLˆt.
B.2 Incomplete Markets with Two Bonds
In the benchmark model, the two countries are not symmetric because we assume that the
international bond is denominated in a particular currency (USD). In this subsection, we consider
a completely symmetric model in which there are two bonds: a US bond and a UK bond. The US
bond payoff is denominated in the US price index so that it is risk-free from the perspectives of US
households. The UK bond payoffs is denominated in the UK price index Pˆt, defined similarly to
Pt. So the budget constraint of the US households, (7a), is modified to:
PtCt +Qt t +Q
b
US,tb
US
t + StQˆ
b
UK,tb
UK
t ≤ (Dt +Qt) t 1 + Ptb
US
t 1 + StPˆtb
UK
t 1 +Wt
where bUSt is the number of US bonds held by the US household; Q
b
US ,t is nominal price of a US
bond (in US dollars); bUKt is the number of UK bonds held by the US household; Qˆ
b
UK,t is the
nominal price of an UK bond (in pounds). Dividing both sides of the nominal budget constraint
by Pt, we obtain the constraint in real terms
Ct + qt t + q
b
US,tb
US
t + Etqˆ
b
UK,tb
UK
t ≤ (dt + qt) t 1 + b
US
t 1 + Etb
UK
t 1 + wt
where qt, q
b
US,t, and wt are the corresponding real values of Qt, Q
b
US,t, and Wt; qˆ
b
UK,t = Qˆ
b
UK,t/Pˆt is
the real price of UK bonds in the UK. We also impose exogenous constraints on real bond holdings
bUSt , b
UK
t ≥ b.
The US NFA at time t is defined as bUSt 1 + Etb
UK
t 1 .
Similarly, the budget constraints of the UK households in nominal and real terms are modified
to
PˆtCˆt + Qˆt ˆt +
Qb
US,t
St
bˆUSt + Qˆ
b
UK ,tbˆ
UK
t ≤ (Dˆt + Qˆt) ˆt 1 +
Pt
St
bˆUSt 1 + Pˆtbˆ
UK
t 1 + Wˆt
and
Cˆt + qˆt ˆt + (q
b
US,t/Et)bˆ
US
t + qˆ
b
UK,tbˆ
EU
t ≤ (dˆt + qˆt) ˆt 1 + (1/Et)bˆ
US
t 1 + bˆ
UK
t 1 + wˆt
Notice that we do not assume that there are transaction costs associated with holding foreign bonds
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(see, e.g., Ghironi et al., 2009), or similarly that the domestic return on foreign bonds exogenously
depends on the level of international debt.
B.3 Results under Different Market Structures
Figure 16 shows the histograms of capital and the US NFA bUSt 1 + Etb
UK
t 1 in the two-bond
incomplete markets model. Compared to the histograms for the benchmark one-bond model in
Figure 3, the distribution of NFA in the two-bond model has an additional mode at 0. This reflects
the fact that having two assets help countries insure against shocks better than having just one
asset. However, the insurance is not perfect so NFAs still move around significantly and households
in each country run up against both of their borrowing constraints (NFA being around 2 or −2),
for US households and for UK households, quite frequently.
Figure 16: Histograms of State Variables in the Two-Bond Model
Note: This figure is generated by the solution of the two-bond model with parameters given in
Table 2.
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Table 5 shows that the correlation between output growth and the real deprecation rate un-
der complete markets and under incomplete markets with one or two bonds is negative. But the
correlation is positive under financial autarky. In addition, the correlation between relative con-
sumption growth and the real depreciation rate is negative under incomplete markets, but is one
under complete markets and is almost one under financial autarky.
Table 5: International Co-movements
RER-Output Corr Backus-Smith Corr
Economy corr (∆ log Yt+1,∆ log Et+1) corr
⇣
∆ logCt+1 −∆ log Cˆt+1,∆ log Et+1
⌘
Data
US vs. UK Negative
Specifications
Complete Markets −0.133 1.000
Incomplete Markets (2 bonds) −0.223 −0.234
Incomplete Markets (1 bond) −0.208 −0.211
Financial Autarky 0.681 1.000
To shed light on these results, Figure 17 shows the IRFs for the main equilibrium variables under
different market structures. The equilibrium dynamics are very similar under incomplete markets
with one bond, our benchmark model, or two bonds. Under complete markets, the real exchange
rate appreciates when productivity increases in the US. However, US consumption increases by less
than UK consumption, leading to a positive correlation between the relative consumption growth
and the real depreciation rate. Under financial autarky, the real exchange rate depreciates, similar
to the responses under incomplete markets with one bond and when the US households are close
to their borrowing limit.
C Exchange Economy
To understand the importance of endogenous capital accumulation and investment in our trans-
mission mechanism, we consider a variant of our baseline model in which capital stocks are fixed at
their steady-state values. This is effectively an endowment economy. Figure 18 displays the IRFs
for the main equilibrium variables under different market structures. Despite the high elasticity of
substitution and persistent endowment shocks, the real exchange rate depreciates upon an increase
in endowment in the US. A greater supply of US traded goods depresses its price relative to UK
traded goods. The results are robust across all financial market structures.
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Figure 17: UIRFs under Different Market Structures
Note: This figure is generated by the solution of the baseline model with parameters given in Table 2 and under
different financial market structures.
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Figure 18: UIRFs in an Exchange Economy and under Different Market Structures
Note: This figure is generated by the solution of the exchange economy under different financial market structures
with parameters given in Table 2 and capital stock fixed at the steady-state value of the baseline model.
D Alternative Productivity Processes
To highlight the endogenous transmission of productivity shocks, in the benchmark model, we
assume that the productivity processes are stationary and productivity shocks are uncorrelated be-
tween the US and the UK. Recent estimates suggest that productivity shocks should be correlated
and productivity processes can be non-stationary. In this section, we show that our mechanisms
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still apply under these alternative specifications for productivity processes. Recent estimates, in-
cluding Heathcote and Perri (2002) and Rabanal et al. (2011) use quarterly data. Therefore, we
use quarterly models and use several model parameters value from Backus et al. (1992). The model
parameters are given in Table 6.
Table 6: Alternative Calibrations
Parameters Descriptions Values
  discount factor 0.9875
  risk aversion 2
↵ = 1− ↵ˆ home consumption share 0.85
✓ consumption elasticity 10
  depreciation rate 0.025
⌘ capital share 0.36
b borrowing limit −1
Stationary Productivity w Correlated Shocks
⇢1 productivity persistence 0.97
⇢2 productivity dependence 0.025
corr✏ correlation of innovation 0.29
 ✏ std of innovation 0.0073
Non-Stationary Productivity
 error-correction parameter 0.007
 ✏ std of innovation 0.01
D.1 Higher Persistence and Correlated Shocks
We use the stationary productivity processes with the estimated persistence and standard de-
viation of innovation from Heathcote and Perri (2002). The dynamics of productivity, (13), are
replaced by
logAt = ⇢1 logAt 1 + ⇢2 log Aˆt 1 + ✏t
and
log Aˆt = ⇢1 log Aˆt 1 + ⇢2 logAt + ✏ˆt,
with the parameters given in Table 6. In addition to the explicit cross country dependence, ⇢2 > 0,
the innovation ✏t and ✏ˆt are also correlated. Table 7 shows that the output-real exchange rate cor-
relation and the Backus-Smith correlation are still significantly negative under the two incomplete
markets specifications. Because the shocks are correlated, the meaning of UIRFs are different from
the ones in the benchmark model. So instead of reporting the impact response of the real exchange
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rate, we report the correlation between the changes in log output, ∆ log Yt+1, and log depreciation
rate, ∆ log Et+1.
Table 7: Co-Movements under Alternative Productivity Processes
RER-Output Corr Backus-Smith Corr
Economy corr (∆ log Yt+1,∆ log Et+1) corr
⇣
∆ logCt+1 −∆ log Cˆt+1,∆ log Et+1
⌘
Stationary Pty (correlated shocks)
Models:
Complete Markets −0.42 1.000
Incomplete Markets (2 bonds) −0.53 −0.67
Incomplete Markets (1 bond) −0.47 −0.63
Financial Autarky 0.70 1.000
Non-Stationary Pty
Complete Markets −0.44 1.000
Incomplete Markets (2 bonds) −0.50 −0.728
Incomplete Markets (1 bond) −0.40 −0.460
Financial Autarky 0.70 1.000
D.2 Non-Stationary Productivity Processes
As noted by Baxter and Crucini (1995), the impact of market incompleteness might depend on
whether the productivity processes have unit roots. To investigate this possibility, we assume that
productivity shocks are almost perfectly persistent and highly correlated: they follow co-integrated
random walk processes.
In this case, the production function takes the form
F (A,K,L) = K⌘ (AL)
1 ⌘
.
We use the specification and estimates from Rabanal et al. (2011):
logAt = logAt 1 +  log
 
Aˆt 1
At 1
!
+ ✏t,
and
log Aˆt = log Aˆt 1 +  log
✓
At 1
Aˆt 1
◆
+ ✏ˆt,
where ✏t and ✏ˆt are I.I.D. and  and std(✏t) = std(✏ˆt) =  ✏ are given in Table 6.
Because productivity processes are non-stationary, we need to adjust the borrowing limits to
make them relevant as productivities evolve over time. For example, in the two-bond incomplete
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markets model, we assume that US households are subject to the following borrowing constraints:
bUSt ≥ bAt, b
UK
t ≥ bAˆt.
Similarly UK households are subject to the following borrowing constraints:
bˆUSt ≥ bAt, bˆ
UK
t ≥ bAˆt.
We solve the model by normalizing the non-stationary variables for a country by its productivity.
We need to keep track of an additional continuous state-variable which is the relatively productivity,
At
Aˆt
. The relatively productivity follows a stationary process:
log
✓
At
Aˆt
◆
= (1− 2) log
✓
At 1
Aˆt 1
◆
+ ✏t − ✏ˆt.
The two-bond model involves the largest number of continuous state variables: the relative produc-
tivity, two capital stocks, Kt
At
, Kˆt
Aˆt
, and two bond positions,
bUS
t
At
,
bUK
t
Aˆt
. This model is also challenging to
solve because it involves the US and UK households’ portfolio choices between USD denominated
bonds and UK pound denominated bonds. The bonds’ returns are also close to being collinear
because the variation of the real exchange rate is small when the elasticity of substitution, ✓, is
high.
For non-stationary productivity processes, Figure 19 shows the marginal distributions of similar
endogenous state variables under incomplete markets, normalized by the productivity levels to
ensure stationarity. Having solved the model, we can examine its implications for exchange-rate,
output, and consumption dynamics.
Table 7 shows that, under complete markets and incomplete markets specifications, the cor-
relation between output growth and real exchange rate is negative. In addition, the incomplete
markets specifications (with either one or two bonds) generate a negative correlation between rel-
ative consumption growth and the real depreciate rate, as in Backus-Smith’s empirical findings.
These results are close to the ones for stationary productivity processes shown discussed in Section
5.
To understand the results, we use the IRFs as in Section 5. The dynamics of equilibrium variables
in Figure 20 upon a positive US productivity shock under different financial markets structures are
similar to the stationary counterparts. However, one notable difference is that productivity, output,
consumption, and investment in the US and the UK do not converge back to pre-shock levels in
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Figure 19: Histograms of State Variables for Incomplete Markets and Growth Shocks
Note: This figure is generated by the solution of the model with co-integrated growth shocks. The upper panels are for the 2-bond incomplete markets model and
the lower panels are for the 1-bond incomplete markets model.
5
8
the long run. This is because the productivity shocks are permanent according to the specification
of productivity process described above.
Except for financial autarky, output in the US increases and real exchange rate appreciates
when the US productivity increases, which leads to a negative correlation between output growth
and the real depreciation rate. Under incomplete markets, US consumption increases at impact
by more than UK consumption does and the real exchange rate appreciates, which leads to a
negative Backus-Smith correlation. The transmission mechanism through the responses of different
consumption components and investment shown in the figure is also the same as in the benchmark
model with stationary shocks.
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Figure 20: UIRFs under Non-Stationary Productivity Processes
Note: This figure is generated by the solution of the model with co-integrated random walks specification for
productivity, under different financial market structures with parameters given in Table 6.
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